"Yet," he adds, "we were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why."
That first sentence-more, it seems, than the details of McNamara's explanations-has prompted a vocal and emotional public reaction that re minds Americans that the conflicts and arguments of that era are still very much with the country today. The vocal response to the book, as much as the text itself, has illuminated how Vietnam rests in American memory. From veterans of the war, from protesters, and from the generals and advisors who were McNamara's colleagues, the public reaction has been a combination of a sense of vindication and a sense of betrayal. A sampling of reactions reported in Boston, New York, and Washington media illustrates the tone of public response: From Senator John McCain of Arizona, a former navy pilot and Vietnam prisoner of war: "I think it's about 25 years too late to save those Americans who would be alive if he hadn't pursued a policy of failure. I can only assume that McNamara's doing it now because he's trying to assume some place in history.
What that place would be, I don't know, unless it would be as one of the architects of a policy that doomed more than 40,000 American young people and caused a division in our country. The Eleven Major Causes range from "1. We misjudged then-as we Summer 1995 -Volume II, Issue 2 have since-the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries-and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions;" to, "3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people (in this case the North Vietnamese and Vietcong) to fight and die for their beliefs and values-and we continue to do so;" to "5. we failed then-as we have since-to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confront ing unconventional, highly motivated people's movements; we failed...to adapt our military tactics to winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture;" to, "6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate about the pros and cons of...involvement...before we initiated action...We failed to retain popular sup port in part because we did not explain fully [to the public] what was happen ing;" to, "9. We did not hold to the principle that US military action-other than in response to direct threats to our own security-should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmeti cally) by the international community;" to, "We did not recognize [that where our own security is not directly at stake McNamara's is a greater and more direct reflection on the roots of such an issue in the personalities, principles, and precepts of those who oversaw American policy. McNamara's own criticism of how that policy was made perhaps applies as well, in this sense, to his own memoir of it: "It seems beyond understanding, incredible, that we did not force ourselves to confront such issues head on."
One issue that McNamara does confront head on is the continuing and often fruitless attempt at gaining information and knowledge about the situa tion in Vietnam, both during the administration of Diem and in the escalation of war that followed. McNamara writes ruefully of the "sparse knowledge, scant experience, and simplistic assumptions" that the policymakers of the Kennedy Administration initially had about events in South East Asia: "Our government lacked experts for us to consult to compensate for our ignorance about Southeast Asia.
[T]op East Asian and China experts in the State Department-John Paton Davies Jr., John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent-had been purged during the McCarthy hysteria of the 1950s. Without [their] sophisticated, nuanced insights, we-certainly I-badly misread China's objectives [and] totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Mirth's movement...We failed to analyze our assumptions, then [under Kennedy] or later. The founda tions of our decision making were gravely flawed."
Information, and its manipulation and analysis, is of course arguably McNamara's area of expertise. Among the number-crunching "Whiz Kids" who were McNamara's contemporaries at Ford, he was known as "the computer." Such expertise and reliance on the quantifiable and the statistical seems to have lent itself well to the task initially facing McNamara at Defense: the management and organization of a massive and complex bureaucracy, the streamlining of a long and complex procurement process, the writing of a five-year plan. "I intended," McNamara writes," that the big decisions would be made on the basis of study and analysis." There emerges from much of the analysis the sense that if only one could learn enough and organize such learning into systems and numbers, that if only one could reduce dilemmas to comprehensible and quantifiable relationships and equations, then the right decisions could have been made. "I always pressed our commanders very hard for estimates of progress-or lack of it," McNamara writes, "The monitoring of progresswhich I still consider a bedrock principle of good management-was very poorly handled in Vietnam. Both the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I bear responsi bility for that failure. Uncertain how to evaluate results in a war without battle lines, the military tried to gauge its progress without with quantitative measure ments such as enemy casualties (which became infamous as body counts), weapons seized, prisoners taken, sorties flown, and so on. We later learned that many of these measures were misleading or erroneous."
McNamara begins his book with the observation that he and his col leagues, "were wrong" in their policy toward Vietnam, despite acting "accord ing to what we taught were the principles and traditions [and values] There is apparent in the book an impulse to generalize, systematize, organize, and enumerate even the very lessons that emerged, arguably, from an overconfidence in the applicability to waging war in Vietnam of generalizations, systems analysis, and organization of information and numbers. McNamara quotes critics of his practice of "measuring the enemy body count [as saying] 'This guy McNamara...tries to quantify everything.'" He makes the valid point that, "the things you can count, you ought to count." But there emerges in In Retrospect a sense of an attempt to count the uncountable, to be, whatever the intention, "the quantifier trying to quantify the unquantifiable," in a phrase used by Halberstam to describe McNamara in 1969. In Retrospect is a depiction of the decisions behind the war, and of their lessons, that is in this sense compelling, and, as with the design and cover of the book itself, perhaps inadvertently apt.®
